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     Abstract. Why is it that couples who have a son or whose last child is a son earn higher 
conditional income? To solve this curious case we tell a detective story: evidence of a 
phenomenon to be explained, a parade of suspects, a process of elimination from the 
enquiry, and then the denouement. Given the draconian family planning policy and a 
common perception that there is strong son preference in rural China, we postulate two 
main hypotheses: income-based sex selection making it more likely that richer households 
have sons, and an incentive for households with sons to raise their income. Tests of each 
hypothesis are conducted. The evidence is inconsistent with the sex selection hypothesis 
but the incentive hypothesis cannot be rejected; and there is evidence in support of the 
channels through which the incentive effect might operate. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study to test these hypotheses in rural China and more generally in developing 
countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
It is the Chinese tradition to place greater emphasis on sons than on daughters, especially 
in rural areas. This preference for boys may be cultural but it can also reflect an economic 
incentive if parents expect to benefit more from their sons than from their daughters. It is 
well documented that preference for boys can involve economic discrimination against 
girls, in developing countries in general and in China in particular. This is evidenced by 
household expenditure patterns which place girls at a disadvantage relative to boys, to be 
found in, e.g., the pioneering work of Deaton (1988) and, in the case of rural China, Song 
(2001). 
 
Over the last quarter century this issue has been accentuated by China’s one-child family 
policy. Parents have had to accept the gender of their only child. Parents with a daughter 
may well have been relatively unhappy, but they have had limited scope to remedy their 
ill-fortune. Some provinces in China have permitted rural parents to have a second child 
if the first was a girl, and, in very recent years, the technology has been available at a 
price to discover the gender of the unborn child and to abort a foetus. Nevertheless, a high 
proportion of peasant families produce only one child. In our 2002 survey the proportion 
of rural households containing a married woman aged 20-49 with one, two, and three or 
more children under 16 were 36%, 47%, and 15% respectively. 
 
Although the effect of child gender on expenditure patterns has been explored in the 
literature, both for China and more generally, there have not, to our knowledge, been 
studies of the potential effect on household income. We intend to examine this issue. 
Does the gender of the child influence the income of the household? We find that it does. 
That raises further questions. With what timing, for what reasons, and by what 
mechanisms is relative income raised, in households with a son? 
 
We use the rural sample of a national household socio-economic survey relating to the 
year 2002, designed by Chinese and foreign scholars including the authors, organised by 
the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), and conducted 
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The CASS survey differs from the NBS’s 
  2annual household income and expenditure survey in that it is a sub-sample of the official 
survey but gathers far more socio-economic information using questionnaires designed 
with research hypotheses in mind. The main findings of the research programme that was 
based on this survey are published in the volume edited by Gustafsson et al. (2007). 
 
As our title suggests, this paper has a touch of detective story about it: evidence of 
something that needs to be explained, a parade of suspects, a process of elimination from 
the enquiry, and then the denouement. Section 2 briefly provides general evidence of son 
preference in rural China. Section 3 establishes the basic fact that income is indeed higher 
for households with a son rather than a daughter. Section 4 sets out four alternative 
hypotheses - three less interesting in their implications than the fourth – and then devises 
and applies a methodology to test each hypothesis. Section 5 explores further the nature 
of the explanation that is favoured by the tests. Section 6 concludes and reflects. 
 
1.  Evidence of son preference 
 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a strong son preference in rural China. This 
preference may reflect old Chinese traditions of male inheritance. Even though the 
tradition was greatly weakened in the twentieth century, the new civil laws which 
permitted daughters and widows to inherit were not always observed (Song 2001, p.291). 
Chu (2001, p.267) argues that parents regard sons and daughters differently: a son is a 
member of the family, whereas a daughter, when she marries, joins the family of her 
husband, normally in another village, and no longer counts as a member. It is the sons, 
therefore, who tend to support their parents in old age. Chu (2001, p.268 ) points out that 
the parents of a girl can expect to receive a bride price on her marriage whereas the 
parents of a boy can expect to pay a bride price and also to provide a house for him on his 
marriage. Chu (2001, p.267) observes son preference in the scale of birth celebrations and 
in the way in which people speak of their sons and daughters. Evidence from the survey 
that we shall use suggests that parents cosset their infant sons more than their infant 
daughters: one-child mothers whose child is under four years work 19% fewer hours if it 
is a boy than if it is a girl, but the disparity in hours changes sign from age four. 
 
The clearest evidence for son preference is a male/female sex ratio for young children, 
which is above the ratio found in unprejudiced societies. The ratio was above 1.0 in the 
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1979. It then became important to ensure, by one means or another, that the family would 
produce a son. Using three comparable CASS national household surveys, the ratio for 
rural children under 5 years was 1.15 in 1988, rose to 1.31 in 1995, and then declined to 
1.17 in 2002, possibly as a result of the policy relaxation in many localities which 
permitted a second child if the first was a boy. 
 
Song (2001) found clear evidence of son preference by examining the determinants of 
household expenditure patterns. The analysis was based on the rural sub-sample of the 
1995 CASS national household survey. In a model predicting household budget shares, it 
was found that the share of expenditure on ‘adult goods’ (alcohol and tobacco) is more 
sensitive, negatively, to the presence of a young son (aged 0-6 years) than to the presence 
of a young daughter. The share of expenditure on health care is similarly more sensitive, 
in this case positively. The model also indicated that budget shares vary with female 
bargaining power within the household. Thus, greater female bargaining power lowers the 
share of spending on adult goods and raises that on education. However, the coefficients 
indicating son preference were the same for households with high and those with low 
female bargaining power. In other words, it seems that women are not the fairer sex! 
Mothers’ favouring of their sons is likely to reflect the greater support in old age that they 
expect from their sons than from their daughters. 
 
The one-child policy is applied in different ways and with different degrees of severity in 
different provinces and even in different counties of rural China. Similarly, there is wide 
variation by province and by county in the availability, and even in the permitted use, of 
the ultrasound technology – formally illegal throughout China since 1986 (Chu 2001, p. 
261) - which enables couples to learn the sex of their unborn child. Nor is the same 
degree of son preference to be found throughout rural China. It is therefore dangerous to 
generalise on the basis of individual local case studies. Nevertheless, a couple of county-
level case studies illustrate the presence of son preference, its operation, and its effects in 
particular cases.  
 
In her study of a single county in Jianxi Province in 2000, Murphy (2003) found the 
male/female sex ratio among children under 5 years to be no less than 1.27. She gave 
three possible reasons for this extremely high ratio, all based on an underlying preference 
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abortions. Murphy regarded the last of these to be the most important. As the policy in the 
county since 1988 had been to impose the one-child policy on parents with a healthy boy 
but to allow parents whose first child was a girl to try again for a boy, the practice of 
aborting female foetuses was likely to be most common among couples who already had 
a girl. The conclusion was that the use of ultrasound technology and sex-selective 
abortion enabled many parents in this county to ensure that they would have a son. 
 
In 2000 Chu (2001) investigated the reasons for the high sex ratio among young children 
in a particular county chosen to be representative of rural central China. It was county 
policy to impose a one-son or two-child rule. If the first child was a boy, a couple could 
apply for a second birth permit at a cost of about 4,000 yuan. There was evidence that son 
preference was very strong in this county - reflected, for instance, in differences in birth 
celebrations and in privileges. The combination of restrictive family planning policy and 
son preference was the main reason for the rise in the sex ratio in recent years, and the use 
of ultrasound sex determination equipment was the main source of the rise. The 
technology was widely available in the county. Among survey respondents, nearly half of 
the reported pregnancies were subject to sex determination by ultrasound examination. 
However, almost all of them were subject in the case of second pregnancies if the first 
child was a girl, and in this case 90% of the foetuses that were discovered to be female 
were aborted. Although it is plausible that income is a determinant of the use of 
ultrasound technology, at no point in this detailed case study did the author consider 
whether household poverty might deter its use. 
 
3.  Child gender and income 
 
The object of this section is to establish that parents with sons earn more income, ceteris 
paribus. We examine only those rural households that comprise a father, a mother and 
one child aged 10 years or under. Table 1 shows that the average income of three-person 
families with sons exceeds that of equivalent families with daughters. The former have 
income equal to 111 % of the latter. It also shows that that the average income of three-or 
four-person families is higher if the last child is a son than if it is a daughter, the former 
being 104 % of the latter. Note that there are many more single-son than single-daughter 
families, and many more two-child families whose second child is a son. These 
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children and the abortion of girls, or unequal child care causing higher infant and child 
mortality of girls, or the rules in several provinces or counties that permit parents whose 
first child is a girl to have a second child.  
 
Will the income premium on sons survive standardisation for other household 
characteristics? Table 2 presents an income function for three-person households in which 
the child is aged 10 years or under, with the log of income as the dependent variable. In 
addition to the dummy variable denoting that the child is a son (daughter being the 
omitted category) we include other explanatory variables that generally proved to have 
statistically significant effects on household income. 
 
Here we concentrate on the OLS estimate in column 1 (columns 2 and 3 will be used in 
subsequent sections). Father’s education and age both raise income significantly, as do 
the value of productive assets and farm land squared. What is important for our purposes, 
however, is that possession of a son rather than a daughter has a significant effect, raising 
income by 13%. An alternative estimate extending the age of the single child to 15 or 
under yields a significant 10% income premium on having a son. There is indeed 
something to be explained. 
 
Because of the rule in some areas that couples with a daughter may have a second child 
we also estimate an income function for three-or four-person households, i.e. parents with 
one or two children. To allow for spacing, we consider children aged 15 years and under. 
If there is son preference we expect income to be ranked in two-child households as 
follows: two sons; a daughter and a son; two daughters .There are six possibilities: 
parents can have a son and then a son, or a single son, a son and then a daughter, a 
daughter and then a son, a daughter and then a daughter, or a single daughter. Five 
dummy variables are shown in Table 3, with a single daughter as the reference group, 
where α represents the coefficient on a child dummy variable, b and g denote whether the 
child is a boy or a girl, and if there are two children the birth order is shown (thus αgb is 
the coefficient for a family with a girl and then a boy, and αg = 0). 
 
Consider column 1 of Table 3. The order of coefficients for two-child households is as 
predicted above, but these differences are not statistically significant. However, having 
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single daughter. Precisely the same is true if the younger of two children is a son. The 
characteristic that distinguishes these three cases from the other three is that the last child 
is a son. Thus, again, there is an income premium that deserves explanation. 
 
4.  Eliminating three hypotheses 
 
We examine four hypotheses to explain the household premium on a son. First, sons may 
contribute more income to the household than do girls. Second, there is the possibility of 
reverse causation: parental income determines the sex of the child because poor 
households cannot avail themselves of the use of the new sex-determining technology. 
Third, there can be sample selectivity: all households want a second child if the first is a 
girl, but poverty prevents poor households from having one whereas less poor households 
succeed and thus leave our sample of three-person households. Fourth - and this is our 
maintained hypothesis – there can be an incentive effect: parents value a son more than a 
daughter, and want to obtain more income in order to provide for the son in various ways. 
We examine the hypotheses in turn, starting with the less interesting ones which we wish 
to eliminate. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Sons, even at a young age, contribute to the income of the household, and 
they do so to a greater extent than daughters. 
 
There is a simple test of this hypothesis. It is to discover whether the dummy variable 
representing a son rather than a daughter is serving as a proxy for the contribution that 
male child labour makes to household income. We introduce into Tables 2 and 3 a new 
variable representing child labour. In Table 2 (relating to one-child households and 
children aged 0-10) the term hours of child labour should pick up the effect of the son’s 
contribution to household income and the coefficient on the term son should fall towards 
zero. However, we see that the coefficient on hours of child labour is not significant and 
the son coefficient is not at all affected (column 2). This result is in any case not 
surprising as almost no hours are worked by children aged 0-10: the average per child is 
one hour a year and fewer than 1% of children do any work at all. 
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apply the same test and obtain the same result (Table 3, column 2). The introduction of 
hours of child labour as an explanatory variable is not significant and has no effect on the 
sign and significance of any of the dummy variables representing the types of family. An 
identical result is obtained when male and female hours are entered separately (equation 
not shown). Again, this outcome is understandable because the children work very little: 
the average is 17 hours per child per year and only 9% of children put in any hours at all. 
 
In summary, the evidence is not consistent with the argument that households which have 
a son or whose last child is a son earn more income because of the son’s own contribution 
to that income. Accordingly, we eliminate Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Families with more income are more willing and able to have a second 
child if the first child is a girl, for instance because they are better able to pay for the cost 
of raising the child or to pay the fine that may be levied for breaking the one-child policy 
rule. There is thus income-related self-selection out of the one-child family sample. This 
explains why, other things being equal, households with sons have higher income. 
 
 The hypothesis implies that both rich and poor families would like to have more than just 
a girl, and that the rich are better able to meet this desire. Bias in sample selection can be 
examined in the following way. If the self-selection process operates, there is a higher 
proportion of richer than poorer households that go on, after having a girl, to have two 
children. Self-selection might therefore produce a conditional income (coefficient) 
ordering: αgb > αb,  i.e. these households have the same incentive to cosset a son but the 
former may have self-selected on the basis of high income. The coefficients in Table 3 
show this expectation is not fulfilled: the difference (0.103 – 0.099 = 0.004) is not at all 
significant. Moreoever, this measure conflates self-selection and any incentive effects 
arising from having two children instead of one. Such an incentive can be measured by 
comparing αgg and αg. Applying the difference-in-difference method, our test of self-
selection becomes (αgb – αb) – (αgg – αg). The value of (αgg – αg) (+ 0.081) is not 
significant and could arise by chance. Whereas the test requires a positive value of the 
combined term, it is negative (- 0.077) although not significantly different from zero. 
Thus our test result is inconsistent with the argument that there is income-based self-
selection into two-child status. Accordingly, we eliminate Hypothesis 2. 
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Hypothesis 3. The technique for discovering the sex of the foetus, introduced in recent 
years, has given rise to self-selection bias. Richer households have greater access to the 
technology and therefore have a higher probability of giving birth to sons. This explains 
why, other things being equal, households with sons have higher income. 
 
One test of this hypothesis is to instrument the variable denoting possession of a son in 
Table 2 (column 3). In this way the effect on income of having a son rather than a 
daughter might be purged of a possible selectivity component. Our exclusion restrictions 
are the county ratio of the number of children aged under 15 to women aged 20-35 ( a 
proxy for the laxity with which the one-child family policy was applied) and the county 
mean birth spacing (a proxy for the extent to which pre-natal birth spacing was used). 
These variables are likely to be associated with having a son but should not have a direct 
effect on household income. If the positive effect of son on income were to be eliminated 
by instrumenting son, this would suggest that selectivity is the explanation; if it were to 
remain, this would suggest that incentives are responsible. We find that the effect of 
instrumenting is actually to raise rather than to lower the coefficient on son – albeit to an 
implausibly high value, possibly reflecting the weakness of the instruments (p-value = 
0.06). 
 
Our second test is to estimate a probit equation for one-child families, the dependent 
variable being the presence of a son. We confine the sample to single children aged 0-10. 
The explanatory variables are, in addition to the intercept, the (instrumented) log of 
household income per capita and, optionally, a set of province dummies. The income 
variable is instrumented because it is likely to be endogenous: households with sons may 
be motivated to earn more income. 
 
 Table 4 reports the results. The test is whether the coefficient on the income variable is 
significantly positive: this would indicate that households with more income are more 
likely to produce a son. In fact, the coefficient, although positive, is not significantly so, 
even at the 10% level. This is true also when province dummies are included, so showing 
the possible effect of income within provinces. The marginals (0.064 across provinces 
and 0.054 within provinces) imply that an increase in ln income by one standard deviation 
(0.677) would raise the probability of having a son by  4.3 and 3.7 percentage points 
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chance. When actual income instead of instrumented income is used (equations not 
shown), its coefficient is generally positive and significant. This result provides support 
for our hypothesis that causation is reversed, i.e. households with sons are motivated to 
increase their income above what they are otherwise predicted to earn. 
 
The sex of the first child need not be important to families which are permitted to have a 
second child, or to have a second child if the first is a girl. The policy varies from one 
province, and even from one county, to another. We therefore wish to identify the 
households living in localities with more restrictive family planning policies, because 
they have more motivation to use the technology. We classify counties according to the 
ratio of the number of children aged under 15 years to the number of women aged 20-35 
(20 being the legal minimum age of marriage). For those counties with a ratio of less than 
1.5 (48 % of the sample), the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. Again, 
there is no reliable evidence that households with more income have a higher probability 
of giving birth to a boy. 
 
Our third test concerns households with two children. Consider the determinants of the 
sex of their second child (Table 5). First, in order to gauge whether the sex of the first 
child influences the sex of the second, we introduce a dummy variable indicating that the 
first child is a girl into the equation predicting the sex of the second child (column 1). 
Whether we introduce a set of province dummy variables (thus indicating the relationship 
within provinces) or not, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 6% and 4% 
levels respectively. The marginals indicate that if the first child is a girl instead of a boy, 
the probability of having a boy is increased by 13 and 11 percentage points respectively. 
These findings constitute evidence of a tendency for couples who have a greater incentive 
for their second child to be a boy to take the necessary steps that will ensure this outcome. 
 
Given that prenatal sex determination and female abortion does occur, especially among 
the couples whose first child is a girl, we test whether the probability of producing a male 
second child is increased by household income, i.e. whether sex selectivity can explain 
the higher income of households whose second child is a son. We see that the coefficient 
on instrumented ln income per capita for the sample as a whole is significantly negative 
(column 2). A possible explanation is that even poor parents have access to the 
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We also use the sub-sample whose first child is a girl, as being the more likely to use the 
technology. Far from being positive, the coefficient on the income variable is again 
negative, although not significantly so (column 3). 
 
Couples with access to ultrasound testing, being more likely to abort female foetuses, 
may well have longer intervals between births. We therefore consider the sub-sample of 
households whose first child is a girl and who live in counties where the mean length of 
birth spacing is four or more years. These couples have both the greater incentive and the 
greater opportunity for prenatal sexing and abortion of female foetuses. Does the 
probability of the second child being a son rise significantly with income in this, the most 
likely, case? Again, we find that the coefficient on the instrumented income variable is 
insignificantly negative (column 4). 
 
In summary, the evidence yielded by our three tests is not consistent with the potential 
argument that the higher income of households with a son rather than a daughter - 
whether he is the only child or the second child - is the result of income-related use of the 
technology that enables richer parents to abort female foetuses. On that basis we set 
Hypothesis 3 aside. 
 
5.  Exploring the Incentive Effect 
 
       Hypothesis 4. On account of their preference for sons, couples with sons rather than 
daughters have an incentive to increase household income in order to support or provide 
for their sons. This may take the form of additional productive assets, hours, or effort. 
 
The hypothesis implies that son preference dominates the possible incentive of son-less 
couples to earn and save more as a source of support in retirement. One potential motive 
for couples with a son to earn more income is to provide the son with more resources, 
either while he is growing up or on marriage. This incentive might be based simply on 
taste, which itself might have been established at a time when son preference served an 
economic function, or on  economic incentive, such as the anticipation of future benefit in 
the form of support in old age. Another potential motive is the direct result of the high sex 
ratio. In the future women of marriageable age will be in scarce supply: they will prefer 
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weds. The sons of poor families may be unable to marry. This motive was found to be 
important in the case study conducted by Chu (2001, pp.276-7). 
 
There are three main ways in which couples seeking more income might manage to do so: 
by accumulating more productive fixed assets, by working longer hours, and by 
improving the efficiency of their income generation, e.g. by seeking out more 
remunerative activities. We are able to throw some light on all three mechanisms. We do 
so by estimating the determinants of the household’s productive fixed assets, of its hours 
of work, and of the mix between hours in farming and hours in non-farming activities – 
the latter being more remunerative than the former (Knight and Song, 2005, ch.8). The 
test is whether, in the case of households with one child aged 0-10, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable denoting that the child is a boy is significantly and substantially positive. 
 
Table 6 reports the results. The equation estimating the determinants of ln productive 
fixed assets shows a significantly positive coefficient on the dummy variable denoting 
that the child is a boy. The coefficient implies that possession of a boy raises productive 
fixed assets by 26% (column 1). We investigated whether this premium builds up as the 
son grows older: the interaction term between child’s age and boy does indeed have a 
positive and large coefficient, hinting that the premium accumulates over time, but the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero (column 2). 
 
The equation estimating hours worked by the household shows a positive but insignificant 
coefficient on the boy dummy variable (column 3). However, we found a marked 
difference in the determination of hours worked on and off the farm. The coefficient on 
boy has a negative, but insignificant and small, value in the equation (not shown) 
predicting farm hours. However, it is positive, highly significant and large in the equation 
for non-farm hours: possession of a son rather than a daughter raises the number of hours 
worked by the household in local non-farm or migrant activities by no less than 45% 
(column 4). It appears that having a son acts as a spur to securing non-farm employment, 
which is generally more remunerative than farming. For instance, in a function to predict 
absolute household income which includes non-farm and farm hours as arguments 
(equation not shown), the ratio of the coefficients of non-farm to farm hours (indicating 
relative marginal income per hour) is no less than 5.5. 
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As a final exercise we attempt to estimate the contribution of the possible incentive 
variables to the gross difference in mean household income between one-child 
households with a son and those with a daughter. A standard Oaxaca decomposition 
analysis is conducted. In the underlying income function for the two types of household, 
we include four explanatory variables, selected because they might be responsive to 
parental incentives to favour boys: productive fixed assets, amount of farmland in use, 
non-farm hours, and farm hours. The mean values of these inputs in households with sons 
exceed those in households with daughters by 30% for productive fixed assets, 3% for 
farmland, and 24% for non-farm hours, and fall short by 10% in the case of farm hours. 
The mean income of the former households is 19% higher than that of the latter.  
 
Table 7 shows the contribution of the incentive variables to the gross income difference. 
The total contribution varies from 37% in the case when the dependent variable is ln 
household income and the coefficients of son-households are used as weights to 70% 
when the dependent variable is absolute household income and the coefficients of 
daughter-households are used. This last figure, for instance, answers the counterfactual 
question: what proportion of the absolute income difference would be eliminated if 
households with girls were to face the same incentives as households with boys? In every 
case it is the difference in non-farm hours worked that makes the dominant contribution. 
This is true of both migrant hours (where the ratio of hours worked in boy-households to 
those in girl-households is 1.20) and local non-farm hours (where the ratio is 1.26). 
Households with sons appear to be more willing to leave the farm and go out and find 
non-farm jobs. 
 
To summarise this section, a substantial part of the gross difference in mean incomes is 
attributable to differences in variables that are likely to reflect differential responses to 
incentives. Thus we have found evidence consistent with there being an incentive effect 
for households possessing sons to earn more income for their sons. We were unable to 
reject Hypothesis 4. 
 
      6. Conclusion 
      There is good reason to believe that couples in rural China have strong son preference. 
We have argued that this might explain the remarkable fact that households whose only 
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a daughter, are found to have significantly higher conditional income. Households may 
have an incentive to earn more income if the child is a boy rather than a girl. The one-
child family policy, in place since 1979, even in the current form that frequently permits a 
second child if the first is a girl, means that couples have a strong incentive to ensure that 
their child, or their second child if the first is a girl, is a boy. The availability of 
ultrasound technology for prenatal sexing, despite its general illegality, means that many 
rural households have the power to determine the sex of their child or their second child. 
Access to the technology may be related to income, on account of the costs likely to be 
involved, so enabling richer households to ensure that they have a son. There may 
therefore be income-based sex selection. The direction of causation between possession 
of a son and household income must therefore be established. 
 
We tested the selection hypothesis by examining the effect of income on the gender of the 
child. By using an instrument for income we could eliminate the incentive effect that 
might otherwise prevent us from identifying the selection effect. In no case did our 
various probit estimations to predict the probability of having a son indicate that income 
has a significant positive effect on that probability. This was true even when we identified 
the households with the stronger incentives or better opportunities to select a son. We 
therefore favoured the incentive hypothesis. Moreover, there was evidence to support this 
explanation, in that the equations to predict the value of productive fixed assets and the 
number of hours spent in non-farm activities had significant positive coefficients on the 
dummy variable indicating that the household had a son rather than a daughter. Moreover, 
the variables which might reflect incentives had a substantial effect: the differences in 
their mean values could in total explain between just over one-third and just over two-
thirds of the mean income difference between households with a boy and those with a 
girl. 
 
A U.S. study (Lundberg and Rose, 2002) found that the gender of mens’children made a 
difference to their labour supply and hourly wages, with sons having stronger positive 
effects, the suggested explanation being in terms of fathers’ preference for sons. 
However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to find evidence consistent with the 
existence of an incentive to increase income arising from son preference in rural China 
and more generally in developing countries. Our evidence is no more than suggestive: we 
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incriminating evidence against them but the jury is still out on the case. Nevertheless, 
Sherlock Holmes’ dictum in Conan Doyle’s The Sign of Four (ch. 6) – “…when you have 
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth” – is 
not fully apposite because what remains has plausibility given the rules and customs of 
peasant society. At a general level, the study confirms the view that institutions such as 
inheritance rules, marriage practices and social norms can be important to an 
understanding of the objectives and behaviour of households in contexts such as is found 
in rural China. 
 
This new topic deserves further research in various environments in which family 
planning policy and in which the taste, the incentive and the means for sex selection of 
children differ. Inevitably, the distinction between the incentive hypothesis and the 
selection hypothesis will be central. Further research should examine the timing of the 
incentive effect in relation to the age of the son, and investigate the possible motives for 
son preference in terms of the economic benefits and costs of sons and daughters that 
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  15Table 1.   Household income by gender of child, one-child and two-child households 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
              Household income                           Number of  
                         (yuan per annum)                           observations 
     ________________________________________________________________ 
        one-child (age 0-10): 
        daughter              8468              202 
        son              9353              303 
        son (daughter = 100)            110.5                   150.0 
 
         one or two-child (age 0-15): 
         last child a son                                 9544                                       1093 
         last child not a son                           9162                                         678 
         son (no son = 100)                             104.2                                      161.2 



































  16        Table 2.  Income function for three-person households 
 
        
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                         OLS          OLS             IV 
    1                          2      3 
        ______________________________________________________________________ 
            son           0.127**       0.128**    1.478**
                                [0.057]          [0.057]                  [0.723] 
            hours of child labour                                             -0.001 
                  [0.002]      
            father’s schooling (years)    0.028*                   0.027*                  0.036* 
                    [0.015]                   [0.015]                 [0.022] 
mother’s schooling               0.039***                0.039***              0.035* 
                [0.013]                   [0.013]            [0.019]        
            father’s age (years)               0.111*                    0.111*                  0.057 
                  [0.062]                   [0.062]            [0.096] 
father’s age squared             -0.002**                  -0.002**              -0.001 
                  [0.001]                  [0.001]             [0.001] 
mother’s age (years)              -0.006       -0.006            -0.015 
                  [0.077]                 [0.077]                   [0.113] 
mother’s age squared              0.000        0.000                      0.001 
                [0.001]                 [0.001]            [0.002]                
       
intercept                 6.972***      6.968***                7.243*** 
                   1.000                  1.001                     [1.455] 
provinces                  yes          yes 
 
mean value of dependent variable       8.897          8.897                     8.897 
adjusted R-squared       0.200                    0.198                     0.205 
number of observations           496      496                        485 
         _____________________________________________________________________ 
             Notes: 1. The sample relates to three-person households with child aged 10 or under. 
                        2. The dependent variable is ln household income, as defined by the NBS.    
Mean household income is 9081 yuan. 
                        3. In this and subsequent tables,*** denotes statistical significance at the one 
per cent, ** at the five per cent, and * at the ten percent level. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. 
     
                       4. Many of the province coefficients (with Beijing as the omitted category) are     
        highly significant. 
 5. In column 3 ‘son’ is instrumented by introducing two variables – the county         
ratio of the number of children aged under 15 to women aged 20-35, and the 
county mean birth spacing – into the first stage equation. Their coefficients 
have the expected signs but the test of excluded instruments is at the 
margin, the overidentification test of all instruments is passed, and the 
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     Table 3.  Income function for three- and four-person households: OLS estimates 
 
                  
1  2 
      ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
son,  son       0.102*    0.101* 
                       [0.056]     [0.056] 
son                       0.103**    0.102** 
        [0.040]    [0.040] 
      son, daughter          0.055      0.052 
        [0.054]    [0.054] 
daughter,  son      0.099**   0.098** 
        [0.048]    [0.048] 
daughter, daughter                     0.081      0.081 
              [0.060]               [0.060] 
hours  of  child  labour          0.0002 
             [0.0001] 
father’s schooling  (years)      0.017**      0.017** 
        [0.007]      [0.007] 
mother’s schooling (years)      0.027***      0.027 
        [0.007]      [0.007] 
father’s  age  (years)     0.066**       0.006** 
              [0.031]                          [0.031] 
father’s age squared        -0.001**               -0.001 
              [0.0004]                [0.0004] 
mother’s  age  (years)     -0.012      -  0.013 
        [0.029]        [0.029] 
mother’s  age  squared     0.0004        0.004 
        [0.0004]     [0.0004]   
value of productive assets (000 yuan)               0.011***      0.007*** 
              [0.002]                          [0.001] 
farm land area (mu)         0.007***       0.010*** 
       [0.001]        [0.002] 
intercept            7.814***                        7.822*** 
        [0.420]    [0.420] 
provinces                yes          yes 
 
 
mean value of dependent variable                8.958        8.958 
      adjusted R-squared        0.230        0.230 
      number of observations            1723            1723 
    _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:     1.  The sample relates to three- or four-person households with children aged 15 or  
                     under. 
                2.  The dependent variable is ln household income, as defined by the NBS. Mean  
                      household income is 9604 yuan. 
          3.   Notes 3-4 of Table 2 apply. 
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Table 4.  Probit equations for the probability of having a son: one-child families  
(coefficient, standard error) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                            All households   Households in counties 




ln household income per capita (instrumented)                   0.179                     0.346 
(0.316)                   (0.540) 
 
intercept                    -1.340                    -2.836 
        (2.813)                    (5.072) 
p-value                                            0.570       0.540             




ln household income per capita (instrumented)                   0.231                      0.663 
                      (0.444)                    (0.876) 
         
province dummies            yes                          yes 
intercept                     -2.194       -5.722 
(4.253)                   (7.602) 
p-value                                                                        0.059                      0.553 
 
mean value              0.060                     0.061                      
number of observations                                                      501                         231 
 
_________________________________________________________________________  
Notes: 1. The sample is of three-person, one-child households in which the child age is 0-10.      
2. The dependent variable is possession of a son = 1 (daughter = 0). 
  3.  *** denotes statistical significance at the one per cent, ** at the five per cent, and 
* at the ten per cent level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
        4. The equations with province dummies have fewer observations because some 
provinces have too little variation and are dropped by the program. 
        5. The criterion for the counties with a low child ratio is that the ratio of children aged 
0-15 to women aged 20-35 < 1.5. This accounts for 48 % of households. 
        6. The two variables used to instrument son in Table 2 were initially specified as 
explanatory variables but, as these were normally not individually significant and 
had no notable effect on the coefficient on income, they are not included in the 
estimates reported in the table.  
7. Ln household income per capita is instrumented using predicted values from an     
income function with explanatory variables age and education, in years, of the 
household head, and whether the household had suffered a natural disaster in 2002. 
8. All exclusion restrictions have the expected sign and are significant. The test of 
overidentifying restrictions is passed, but the endogeneity test cannot reject the 
hypothesis that income is exogenous.  
 
    Table 5.  Probit equations for the probability that the second child is a son: two-child    
families (coefficient, standard error) 
 
             All households                Households          Households with 
                                with first               first child a girl 
                      child a girl    in counties with 
                                          longer birth  
              spacing 
                                                __________________ 
Column:                                  1                         2                       3                          4 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
    ln income per capita                                      -0.826*            -0.750           -1.157** 
 (instrumented)           (0.487)            (0.605)           (0.799) 
    first child a girl    0.297* 
                 (0.166) 
   
    intercept      0.134                    7.579**         7.050*           10.190** 
                 (0.130)                 (4.281)        (5.341)           (7.098) 
    p-value      0.074                    0.090         0.216            0.148 
    mean value               0.624                   0.625         0.671            0.479. 




    ln income per capita          -1.776**        -0.580          -2.456 
    (instrumented)            (0.737)        (0.557)          (2.439) 
    first child a girl                    0.351* 
    (0.201) 
     
    province dummies       yes           yes            yes    yes 
    intercept      -6.400         7.805          -3.852**          19.254 
        (0.537)        (5.035)               (1.543)          (17.981) 
    p-value                 0.001          0.047           0.208               0.810 
    mean value                0.619           0.620           0.618           0.452 
     
    number of observations    239                      237                        123         31 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 1.  The dependent variable is that the second child is a son = 1 (daughter = 0). 
2.  The criterion for counties with a long birth spacing is that the mean interval  
between the births is four years or more. 
              3.   Notes 3-5 of Table 4 again apply. 
              4.  All exclusion restrictions have the expected sign, and all are significant except 
the disaster term in three instances. The test of overidentifying restrictions is 
passed but the endogeneity test rejects the hypothesis that income is endogenous 
except in the equations for the restricted samples with province dummies.  
 
 
 Table 6.  Determinants of the value of productive fixed assets and of hours worked,  





Dependent variable:                                 productive fixed                         hours worked 
               assets                                 ____________________ 
                 total     non-farm 
             ___________________         ____________________ 
Column:                                                      1                      2                       3                     4 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                          
boy              0.230*      -0.041        0.076     0.370*** 
                                 ( 0.132)             (0.399)            (0.056)          (0.120)   
child’s age                 -0.055 
                 (0.046) 
child’s age*boy                0.042 
                 (0.055)     
farm area (mu)                                        0.023**             0.023**           0.004         -0.017     
father’s years of schooling        0.053*               0.053        -0.010       0.023 
mother’s years of schooling                    0.005                 0.005         0.010       0.052* 
father’s age         0.063                    0.077         0.081       0.343** 
father’s age squared                            -0.002        -0.002        -0.001     -0.005** 
mother’s age        -0.160                  -0.12                -0.030      -0.215 
mother’s age squared     0.003          0.003         0.001       0.003 
province dummies         yes            yes                  yes         yes 
intercept        3.844          3.176        7.166***     4.894*** 
 
mean value of dependent variable       0.885           0.885          7.989       7.052 
adjusted R-squared      0.130          0.129           0.025       0.208 
number of observations           416       416                     495             383 
 
Notes: 1. The dependent variables are ln value of productive fixed assets and ln hours  
      worked. 
     2.  Several of the coefficients on the province dummy variables (with Beijing as the    
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Table 7.  Decomposition analysis of the gross income difference between one-child 





                    Using the coefficients of: 
      _______________________________________ 
                                            daughter-          son-                         
                households                        households 
          ___________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable: ln household income 
         
percentage contribution made by: 
productive  fixed  assets    3.06     1.38 
land area farmed                    1.20        0.50 
non-farm hours                  53.83                    37.45   
farm hours                                                                 -0.17                -2.49 
total                                   57.93                36.84 
 
 
Dependent variable: household income 
 
percentage contribution made by: 
productive  fixed  assets    5.02     1.48 
land  area  farmed      0.93     0.29 
non-farm hours                  68.67                56.44 
farm hours                    -4.43                -5.92 
total                        70.19               52.30 
  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The decomposition is based on the standard Oaxaca formula, with βgXb – βgXg being 
the term showing the effect of difference in mean characteristics on the gross mean 
income difference when the coefficients of the households with a girl are used as 
weights, and βbXb – βbXg the corresponding effect when the coefficients of households 
with a boy are used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 